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viding definite guidelines to be followed. 1 Now that Texas is leading this
new trend, its courts should continue to protect the unwary home buyer
and even the innocent neighbor from the defective work of a careless
builder-vendor who has been able to hide behind the outdated doctrine of
caveat emptor too long.
Clyde R. White

NLRB v. Strong: The Board Versus the Courts and Arbitration
Respondent sought to withdraw from a multi-employer bargaining association five days after the effective date of an agreement negotiated on
his behalf.' He refused repeated demands from the union that he sign the
contract. The National Labor Relations Board found that his refusal to
sign the contract was an unfair labor practice in violation of sections 8(a)
(1) and 8 (a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The Board ordered
respondent to sign the contract, cease and desist from unfair labor practices, post notices, and pay any back fringe benefits provided for in the
contract.' The court of appeals' refused to enforce that part of the Board's

order requiring payment of back fringe benefits.' Held, reversed: When an
employer repudiates a contract negotiated by his bargaining association,
the NLRB's remedies may include an order to pay back fringe benefits
due under the contract. NLRB v. Strong, 393 U.S. 357 (1969).
I.

LANGUAGE vs. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Confusion exists in determining the NLRB's power to provide a com-

plete remedy for an unfair labor practice when the remedy requires the
enforcement by the Board of collective bargaining contract provisions. The
statutory language grants the Board broad powers to provide relief, while
" See Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent

Assaults Upon the Rule, 14 VAND.

L. REv. 541, 576-78 (1961).
' Respondent Strong was a regular member of the Roofing Contractors Association of Southern
California. The Association's bylaws provided: "Any . . . labor contract negotiated . . . shall be
binding upon the regular members of this Association separately and collectively." On August 14,
1963, the Association and the Union (Roofers Local 36, United Slate, Tile and Composition Roofers, Damp and Waterproof Workers Association) agreed on a new four-year contract, to be effective
August 15, 1963.
On August 20, 1963, Strong wrote to a grievance board composed of contractor and Union
representatives, requesting termination of the contract and the refund of his security deposit. In
September 1963, Strong asked the Association to change his status to that of an associate contractor not covered by the Association's collective bargaining agreement. He continued, however,
to pay regular member's dues until December 1963, and also paid fringe benefits in September and
October of 1963.
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1), (5) (1964). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer(I) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 157 of this title; ....
(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .... "
8In re Strong, 152 N.L.R.B. 14 (1965).
4NLRB v. Strong, 386 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1967).
s That part of the order, the court said, "is an order to respondent to carry out provisions of
the contract and is beyond the power of the Board." Id. at 933.
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the legislative history of the statute indicates congressional intent to limit
such power. The NLRB's authority to fashion remedies for unfair labor
practices rests on section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act,'
which empowers the Board, upon finding an unfair labor practice, to order
the guilty party "to take such affirmative action including reinstatement
of employees with or without back pay as will effectuate the policies of
this subchapter."' The NLRA also states that the Board's authority is not
"affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been
or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise . . . ,"The United
States Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized the breadth of the Board's
power to fashion remedies." In addition, the Court has said that the Board's
remedy should put the parties where they would have been "but for" the
unfair labor practice." In light of these considerations the Board has acted
in many cases to remedy unfair labor practices which were also breaches of
contract. Often it has provided for the compensation reserved by the contract. 1 Of course, the Act specifically provides for back pay as a Board
remedy, but the Board has defined "back pay" rather broadly."
Despite the breadth of the Board's power under 10 (c)," legislative intent and several Supreme Court decisions indicate that the jurisdiction of
the Board does not displace that of arbitrators and the courts in interpreting
and enforcing collective bargaining agreements. The legislative history
629 U.S.C. § 160(c)
I d.

(1964).

8

National Labor Relations Act S 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). However, clear limitations on the Board's power to adjudicate unfair labor practices have developed: The action must
be remedial rather than punitive. Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938). See also
Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7 (1940). Also, the action must be appropriate to the
particular situation confronting the Board at the time. See NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310
U.S. 318 (1940).
'See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (employer ordered
to resume maintenance work "contracted out" without bargaining with the union, and to reinstate affected employees with back pay); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v.
NLRB, 366 U.S. 731 (1961) (employer ordered to withdraw recognition from union that lacked
majority when originally recognized, and to cease giving effect to collective bargaining agreement
executed with that union after it had secured majority); Frank Bros. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702
(1944) (employer ordered to bargain with union, notwithstanding its loss of majority, where
such loss was attributable to employer's unfair labor practices); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 U.S. 533 (1943) (dues paid to employer-dominated union reimbursed to employees
from whose wages they had been withheld under closed-shop, checkoff arrangements); National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350 (1940) (employer ordered to cease giving effect to individual contracts secured through unfair labor practices, and to notify employees they were
released from obligations imposed by those contracts); NLRB v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 308 U.S. 241 (1939) (disestablishment ordered of labor organization in whose
formation employer had unlawfully interfered).
"Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941).
"See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967); Mastro Plastics Corp. v.
NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
2In NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26 (1967) the Board included vacation
benefits in its definition of "back pay." The Board has also included in its orders to reinstate
with back pay: tips (Club Troika, Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 90 (1936)); Christmas gifts (Moss Planning
Mill Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954), enforcement denied on other grounds, NLRB v. Moss Planning Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955)); shift differentials (Brown & Root, Inc., 132
N.L.R.B. 486 (1961),

enforced, NLRB v. Brown & Root, Inc., 311 F.2d 447 (8th Cir. 1963));

safety awards (Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1701 (1965),

remanded on other

grounds, NLRB v. Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 360 F.2d 569 (5th Cir. 1966)); and bonuses
(International Trailer Co., 150 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1965)). If back pay is required, the NLRB has
the power to compute it. See Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952); Note, A Survey of Labor
Remedies, 54 VA. L. REv. 38 (1968).
2

" National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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behind section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act'4 indicates a preference for
forums other than the Board for adjudication of contract disputes. The
early version of the bill passed by the Senate in 1947 contained a provision which called for the inclusion of breach of contract among the unfair
labor practices subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.'" In conference,
however, this provision was dropped in favor of contract enforcement by
the usual processes of law rather than the NLRB.'"
The congressional preference of submitting contract disputes to the
courts and arbitration has been given substantial weight by the federal
courts. In NLRB v. American National Insurance Co. " the Supreme Court
refused to enforce a Board order directing the employer to refrain from
insisting on a broad management relations clause in a collective bargaining
agreement. The Court said that the "Board may not, either directly or indirectly, compel concessions or otherwise sit in judgment upon the substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."'" In Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills" the Supreme Court said that industrial peace can best be
served by enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in the courts."
While the courts are felt to be a preferred forum for contract disputes,
labor arbitrators are considered best equipped to handle the industrial common law lying behind such agreements.' However, despite the preference
shown to arbitrators and the courts the remedies available in each forum
are considered cumulative, not exclusive. 2'
The difficult question is the scope of the Board's remedial powers when
the unfair labor practice involves repudiation of the contract and thus is a
violation of section 8 (a) (5).'s The Supreme Court dealt with the problem
of a breach of a collective bargaining agreement by repudiation in H.J.
Heinz Co. v. NLRB. 4 There the Court enforced a Board order requiring an
employer to sign a written contract embodying agreed-upon terms.2' In
"4Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964).
'5S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8(a) (6), (b) (5) (1947).
"H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1947). For further discussion, see
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505-12 (1962).
17343 U.S. 395 (1952).
18Id. at 404.
"9353 U.S. 448 (1957).
'Old. at 455.
"' United Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
As between the courts and arbitration, legislation and court decisions point to a preference
for the method agreed upon by the parties. Labor Management Relations Act § 203 (d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1964): "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be
the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."
In John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), and the Steelworkers Trilogy
[United Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)] the Supreme Court emphasized
that the "preference of national labor policy for arbitration as a substitute for tests of strength
between contending forces could be overcome only if other considerations compellingly so demanded." John Wiley & Sons, sufpra at 549-50.
"Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1967); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n,
371 U.S. 195 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
aNational Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964).
24311 U.S. 514 (1941).
"Id. at 526. The Court held that a refusal to sign was in violation of § 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964), and that the remedy was authorized
by § 10(c) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
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1965 the Ninth Circuit enforced a similar order, requiring the employer to
honor the contract.5 In doing so, it clarified what it meant by "honor":
Read in this light, the word 'honor' has the limited role of placing the
parties, with reference to the contract, back in the position which they occupied prior to the breach. It does not mean that specific performance was
decreed .... Nor is it an adjudication as to the validity of any or all of the
contract provisions."
In other words, "honor" meant simply to sign the contract. This was as
far as the Board had gone until it decided Schill Steel Products, Inc. 8 Instead of merely ordering the employer to sign the contract, the Board
ordered the employer to reimburse employees for the loss of any benefits
plus interest which would have accrued to them under the contract which
the employer had refused to sign."9 The Board's decision in Schill Steel
went unchallenged and was not appealed to the courts.
II. NLRB v. STRONG
The United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Strong' approved the
Board's assertion of its authority to order payment of back fringe benefits in a refusal to bargain situation. While recognizing the overlapping
regimes of the Board and the courts in contract disputes and the preference
historically given the courts and arbitrators in such disputes, the Court reasoned that it was necessary to interpret and give effect to the terms of the
contract in order to remedy this particular unfair labor practice. The Court
relied on the broad language of section 10 (c) of the National Labor Relations Act"' and its own language and decisions in Phelps Dodge Corp. v.
NLRB"2 and NLRB v. C & C Plywood." The Court also added that this
remedy was appropriate since the "employer refused to recognize the very
existence of the contract providing for the very arbitration on which he
now insists."' 4
Notwithstanding the broad language of section 10 (c) the Court in
Strong has removed a significant restraint upon the remedial powers of the
Board. The same language has previously been before the Court in similar
situations, but the Court has never gone beyond ordering the employer to
honor the contract. Although the workers were made whole in Phelps
Dodge, the unfair labor practice there was a refusal to hire because of
union affiliation. To remedy this the Court enforced a Board order requiring an offer of employment plus payment of losses suffered as a result of the
26NLRB v. Hyde, 339 F.2d 568 (9th Cir. 1965).
27 Id. at 572-73.
28 161 N.L.R.B. 939 (1966).
2"id. at 941.
30393 U.S. 357 (1969).
"'29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
32 313 U.S. 177 (1941).

"4 385 U.S.
2 NLRB v.
35See notes
36313 U.S.

421 (1967).
Strong, 393 U.S. 357, 361 (1969).
26-29 supra, and accompanying text.
177 (1941).
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unfair labor practice." In C &qC Plywood8 the Court agreed that it was
necessary for the Board to interpret a contract to discover that the employer's unilateral institution of a premium-pay plan was not authorized
3
and thus was an unfair labor practice."
But the Board there went only as
far as issuing a cease and desist order. 0
The Board and the Court in C & C Plywood could not have closed their
eyes to the contract and still have remedied the unfair labor practice. It was
not necessary, however, for the Board or Court in Strong to interpret any
of the specific terms of the contract to remedy the refusal to bargain.
They needed only to recognize the existence of the contract and to order
Strong to honor it. Such a decision would not have denied the employees a
chance of recovery of back fringe benefits. They still could have been
made whole by submitting the matter to arbitration, as provided in the
contract, or to the courts. Such a course has heretofore been the preferred
method of effectuating the policies of the Act.
III. CONCLUSION
The Strong decision raises significant questions as to the Board's innovative use of its section 10 (c) powers. By not deferring jurisdiction on the
matter of back fringe benefits to the courts or arbitration, the Board and
the Court swept away much of the legislative and common law preference
for these forums in matters of contract interpretation and enforcement.
The language of the Act indicates that the Board has always had the power
to reach such a decision. Whether it was because of a feeling that the courts
and arbitrators were better equipped to handle these matters, or because
it felt that any extension of its power into this area would not be supported
by the courts, the Board exercised restraint. But it asserted its power in
Strong and the Supreme Court concurred.
Possibly the Board's powers were expanded in the interest of efficiency.
By making a full determination of all issues before it, the Board can save
the parties the time and expense of arbitration or a lawsuit. This rationale
would be easier to justify if not for the long history of recognition of judicial and arbitral expertise in this area. By continued innovative use of its
section 10(c) powers there is a danger that the Board will become the
primary forum for labor contract disputes, compelling concessions, and
otherwise sitting in judgment upon substantive terms of collective bargaining agreements."' This cannot be justified, and hopefully the Supreme
Court will not be so receptive of such Board actions.

Ira D. Einsohn

7id.

at 194.

338 5 U.S. 421 (1967).

81Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
41This was expressly forbidden by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co.,
343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952). See Notes 17, 18 supra, and accompanying text.
40

